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Science by Conceptual Analysis: 
The Genius of the Late Scholastics
James Franklin
The late scholastics—  om the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries—have 
suﬀ ered  om a severe reputational problem. Attacked by every major thinker 
 om Descartes to the Encyclopedists, they were a favourite target of abuse for 
Enlightenment rewritings of intellectual history, representing the darkness  om 
which the Enlightened oﬀ ered to rescue humanity. When scholasticism did 
revive in the late nineteenth century, it was largely Thomist, and twentieth-
century neo-Thomism was fond of blaming the “decadent scholastics” and their 
“Suarezian errors” for the decline of Catholic philosophy. Their works are still 
mostly untranslated, so with the loss of Latin as a widely-read language, their 
thought has become increasingly inaccessible.1
That failure of understanding applies not only to the late scholastics’ strictly 
philosophical views, but to the contributions they made to wider spheres of 
thought by the deployment of their skills of conceptual analysis to topics other 
than philosophy. Their contributions are in many cases “known” to experts in 
the history of particular fi elds, but somehow not generally understood outside 
each fi eld, and hence invisible “in the mass”. The purpose of this article is to 
give a short overview of some of their main achievements that have proved to be 
lasting contributions to intellectual history. The article aims at breadth rather 
than depth but provides substantial references for further study.
1 Survey of the later period in D. D. Novotný, “In defense of Baroque scholasticism”, Studia 
Neoaristotelica 6 (2009): 209–233.
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Section 1: The natural and mathematical sciences
The scholastics adopted the Aristotelian ideal of the intellectual enterprise, as 
described in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and implemented in Euclid’s Elements: 
that certain knowledge could be gained by the intellect’s refl ection on experience, 
and organised as a deductive structure following  om simple axioms known 
with certainty.2 They added to that ideal a training in argument designed to 
reveal the true axioms and to refute errors, and an embodiment of the result in 
a textual tradition and an institution designed to carry the tradition forward  om 
generation to generation, the university.
Not all branches of knowledge are well adapted to that mode of discovery and 
transmission. What is remarkable, as the late scholastics showed, is how many are.
1.1 Mathematics: The analysis of continuous change
The work of the fourteenth-century “Merton School” and its French collabo-
rators Jean Buridan (c. 1300 – c. 1359) and Nicole Oresme (c. 1322 – 1382) has been 
well-known since Duhem and has been intensively studied by Maier, Sylla and 
others and well displayed in many selections in Grant’s Source Book in Medieval 
Science.3 It has been highlighted again in Hannam’s recent book on the medieval 
roots of modern science, God’s Philosophers.4 However it has usually been thought 
of as part of physics, and the scholastics have been regarded as “forerunners of 
Galileo” (in the title of Maier’s book5). That is true as far as it goes, but it dis-
tracts attention  om their achievements in the pure analysis of continuity and 
change. Their discoveries are better explained in Boyer’s History of Calculus, 
where they are recognised as an essential part of the process of the analysis of 
rates and change that was completed by the calculus of Newton and Leibniz.6
2 R. D. McKirahan, Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative science (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). 
3 A. Maier & S. D. Sargent, On the Threshold of Exact Science: Selected Writings of Anneliese Maier 
on Late Medieval Natural Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982); E. D. Sylla, 
The Oxford Calculators and the Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350: Physics and Measurement by Latitudes 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); G. Molland, Mathematics and the Medieval Ancestry 
of Physics (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995); survey in E. Sylla, “The Oxford Calculators”, in The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny & J. Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), ch. 27; selections in E. Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), especially §§ 26, 41, 51. 
4 J. Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science 
(London: Icon, 2009), chs 11–12.
5 A. Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert: Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik 
(Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949).
6 C. B. Boyer, The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover, 1959) ch. 3.
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Mathematics is usually thought to be a model of absolute clarity of thought, 
achieved with the use of symbols, and hence no place for scholastics to be delving 
in. But a pre-requisite of most mathematics is analysis of concepts confusedly 
present in experience, and in this the scholastics were masters. Ancient math-
ematics, mainly mathematical astronomy, had some understanding of large-scale 
uniform motions and their combinations, but there was no understanding of 
small-scale motions. For example, there is no unit of speed (such as “miles per 
hour”) in ancient languages, no doubt largely due to the impossibility of measur-
ing small units of time. The fi rst thing needed to begin the study of motion (or 
any other rate of change) is to distinguish between uniform and non-uniform 
speeds— in mathematical terms, between a fi rst and a second derivative. That 
distinction is a matter of pure conceptual analysis. The fourteenth century cal-
culators not only did that, but distinguished further between uniform and non-
uniform accelerations. Then they showed a deep understanding of uniform 
acceleration by proving the “Merton mean speed theorem”: that a uniformly 
accelerated body travels the same distance as a body of uniform speed whose 
speed equals half the fi nal speed of the accelerated body.7 In the later language 
of calculus, that is to show that the integral of a constant function is a linear 
function.
It is true that the scholastics did not establish the main application of their 
analysis in physics, the fact that heavy bodies dropped near the earth’s surface 
are uniformly accelerated. That is a diﬃ  cult fact to discover, because the fall 
of such bodies is too fast to measure easily (without modern technology such 
as time-lapse photography). It was established with considerable experimental 
ingenuity by Galileo. Nevertheless the suggestion that falling bodies might be 
uniformly accelerated was made by a scholastic whose work was known to Galileo, 
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), in his Questions on the Eight Books of Aristotle’s 
Physics (1551).8 Indeed, as Wallace’s careful studies showed, the early Galileo was 
a late scholastic himself.9 For example, his graphical proof of the mean speed 
theorem is very close to Oresme’s.10
7 Grant, Source Book, §§ 42–43.
8 W. A. Wallace, Domingo de Soto and the Early Galileo: Essays on Intellectual History (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004).
9 W. A. Wallace, Galileo’s Early Notebooks: The Physical Questions (Notre Dame, Ind: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1977); W. A. Wallace, Galileo and His Sources (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984); E. A. Reitan, “Thomistic natural philosophy and the Scientifi c Revolution”, Modern Schoolman, 
73 (1996): 265–281.
10 Hannam, God’s Philosophers, 330–332.
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Oresme also invented the concept of graphs, one of the few mathematical 
discoveries since ancient times that are familiar to every reader of newspapers, 
and one of the crucial tools for thinking about functions.
A page of graphs  om a manuscript of Oresme’s
Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum (1486)
(MPIWG Library, Berlin)
Analysis of infi nities and the continuum is also suited to the conceptual 
methods of the scholastics;11 Albert of Saxony (c. 1320–1390) pairs oﬀ  infi nite 
sets “in the imagination” in the same style as Cantor.12
11 N. Kretzmann, Infi nity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1982).
12 Albert of Saxony, Commentary on De Caelo, summarised in J. Sesiano, “On an algorithm for the 
approximation of surds  om a Provençal treatise”, in Mathematics From Manuscript to Print 1300–1600, 
ed. C. Hay (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 42–7.
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1.2 Mathematical physics
The situation is partly but not wholly diﬀ erent for physics. The thesis of 
Duhem, that much of early modern physics was anticipated by the Merton 
School and associated scholastics in the fourteenth century, is well known and 
has been the object of much discussion. Despite some qualifi cations, it has largely 
stood the test of time.13 But physics is not the subject in which the scholastics 
show to best advantage. While the medieval aversion to observation and experi-
ence in general is much exaggerated, and while the idea of mathematised science 
was understood, it is undeniable that controlled experiment and accurate measure-
ment were largely absent  om medieval science.14 The medievals supported their 
physical theories with “experience”, but they usually meant common experience, 
“what everyone knows”. Without careful measurement and experiment, the 
conceptual analysis that is the strong point of the scholastic method could make 
only limited progress in physics, and it is Galileo’s addition of those ingredients 
to the recipe of science that make his reputation for originality entirely deserved. 
Still, purely conceptual work, combined with everyday experience, can result in 
some good physics as well as good social science or law— statics, the subject of 
Duhem’s original work,15 can progress a good way purely on symmetry con-
siderations, while the distinction between velocity and acceleration, necessary 
for any serious work on motion, is as we saw purely a matter of mathematical 
concepts. It is certainly possible to criticize the late scholastics for doing physics 
without proper experimentation and measurement. However, it is not customary 
to criticize Einstein for his lack of experiment. Analysis and theory are crucial to 
physics (and even more so to mathematics).
For the same reason but more so, the more down-to-earth empirical sciences 
were inappropriate for the scholastic method. Chemistry, pharmacology and 
metallurgy are examples: knowledge about the eﬀ ects of chemicals and drugs 
and the strength of materials is so heavily empirical that looking into oneself 
13 P. Duhem, Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci (Paris: Hermann, 1906–1913); R. Ariew and P. Barker (eds.), 
Duhem as Historian of Science, special issue of Synthese, 83, 2 (1990); S. L. Jaki, Uneasy Genius: The Life 
and Work of Pierre Duhem (The Hague: Nĳ hoﬀ , 1984), ch. 10; R. N. D. Martin, Pierre Duhem (La Salle, 
Ill: Open Court, 1991), chs. 8–9; J. E. Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem and the history of late medieval science 
and philosophy in the Latin west”, in Gli studi di fi losofi a medievale fra otto e novecento, ed. R. Imbach & 
A. Maierù (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1991), 253–302; overview in E. Grant, The Foundations 
of Modern Science in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 8.
14 Many articles in E. Grant & J. E. Murdoch (eds.), Mathematics and its Applications to Science and 
Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); A. C. Crombie, 
“Quantifi cation in medieval physics”, Isis 52 (1961): 143–60; also Colish, ch. 24.
15 P. Duhem, Les origines de la statique (Paris: Hermann, 1905); trans. G. F. Leneaux, V. N. Vagliente 
and G. H. Wagener as The Origins of Statics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
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and analysing concepts will not make much progress, however good a memory 
one has. It is not an accident that these disciplines were undeveloped before 
very modern times. What knowledge there was in them was more a mass of 
engineering expertise than a scientifi cally grounded body of facts. In particular, 
they lacked a methodology for improving themselves.
1.3 Probability and risk
Probability, on the other hand, is perfect for conceptual analysis. Indeed, 
the continuing controversies in the philosophy of probability show how diﬃ  cult 
the analysis is.
Probability is essentially of two kinds, at least on the surface. On the one 
hand, there is logical probability, dealing with the relation of evidence to conclu-
sion in such areas as legal “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and the evidence for 
scientifi c theories. On the other, there is factual or stochastic probability, dealing 
with the long-run  equencies in the patternless outcomes of chance phenomena 
like the throwing of dice and coins.16 Both kinds of probability became well 
understood, in a qualitative and conceptual way, in the late scholastic period 
prior to the foundation of the mathematical theory of probability by Pascal and 
Fermat’s correspondence of 1654.
The central story of the developing understanding of logical probability lies in 
the law of evidence. Based on scattered remarks of ancient Roman law, the legal 
scholarship of the Glossators and Post-Glossators (12th–14th centuries) developed 
an elaborate grading of proofs—  om suspicions and “indications” through half-
proofs to “evident and manifest” proofs and “violent presumptions”, up to the 
“proofs clearer than light” required for conviction in a criminal case.17 The full 
theory was laid out with many distinctions in the commentaries of Baldus de 
Ubaldis (1327–1400). He writes, for example,
Note that two imperfect kinds of proof, and two presumptions of diﬀ erent 
sorts, and one witness to truth, and two to reputation do not make full proof 
in a criminal case; for there is only the single witness to truth [not the two 
required by the Biblical two-witness rule].18
16 Introductions to the distinction in J. Franklin, What Science Knows: And How It Knows It (New 
York: Encounter Books, 2009), ch. 10; I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 2.
17 J. Franklin, The Science of Coǌ ecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), chs. 2–3.
18 Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, 32.
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That theory was familiar in legal circles in the 16th and 17th centuries, being 
elaborated in huge treatises on proofs and presumptions such as those of Jacobus 
Menochius (1532–1607) and Josephus Mascardus († 1588). These works are re-
ferred to by Leibniz and by 19th century English and American writers on the 
law of evidence, indicating the extraordinary power of legal tradition to preserve 
and propagate ideas.19
The ideas percolated into society more generally via canon law and the theory 
of casuistry (moral analysis of particular cases), developed because the confes-
sional was thought of as a miniature court of canon law. It was this context 
that produced the 16th century scholastics’ moral doctrine of probabilism, the 
theory that in case of doubt as to the morality of an action, one might follow 
a suﬃ  ciently probable course, even if the opposite opinion was more probable. 
“Probable” here refers to the balance of reasons and authorities in favour of an 
opinion. The possible consequences of this doctrine for laxity in morals became 
a matter of intense public debate through the celebrated attack on Jesuit proba-
bilism in Pascal’s Provincial Letters of 1656.20
Discussion of factual probability was found mostly in legal and moral works 
on “aleatory contracts”— contracts whose outcome depends on some matter of 
chance, such as insurance, life annuities, options contracts, speculative invest-
ments and gambling. It was understood that in such contracts a payment was 
made for a “hope”, “peril” or “risk”, that is, for a probability based on how o en 
some outcome tended to occur, and that this distinguished such contracts  om 
usury, the lending of money at interest.21 Thus Domingo de Soto, answering 
the objection that insurance appears to involve a payment for nothing, compares 
it to a game of chance:
For anything that can be estimated at a price, one can receive a fee: to render 
a thing safe [insure it], which is exposed to peril, can be estimated at a price 
… we say of a fair game: whether it will rain tomorrow or not, etc; so in 
the same way it is permitted to expose a thousand ducats, say, to peril with 
the hope of making fi    or sixty. There are some who regard it as stupid to 
allow the peril of someone’s ship worth perhaps twenty or thirty thousand, 
in the hope of making a hundred or a thousand. To this we reply that it is 
not for us to dispute about prices: these can be just or uǌ ust, but it is for 
the contracting parties to decide them. But there is no stupidity or folly in 
19 Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, 43–46.
20 Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, ch. 4; I. Kantola, Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval 
and Early Modern Times (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994).
21 Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, ch. 10.
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accepting this kind of peril at the going price; in fact nothing is more obvi-
ous than that insurances can expect to gain. They may lose sometimes, but 
at other times they accumulate gain.22
Gambling, lotteries and other bets was one of the topics discussed under 
aleatory contracts. Antonio Escobar y Mendoza (1589–1669), the casuist most 
vigorously attacked in Pascal’s Provincial Letters, argued that for games to be per-
mitted, equality of the stakes was normally required but that a player might licitly 
stake less money if his potential winnings were greater.23 These questions are 
close to the case of conscience which led Pascal and Fermat to their mathematical 
calculations, the just division of the stake in an interrupted game of chance.24
Section 2: The social sciences and psychology
It is a commonplace that the contemporary social sciences are riven by dis-
putes about theory in a way that the natural sciences are not. Economics, an-
thropology, and legal and political theory are still full of vigorous debates about 
what concepts should be used to organise and ask questions about the empirical 
data— even debates about whether there are any empirical data  ee of theoretical 
perspectives. That is an indication that those fi elds are prime candidates for the 
conceptual analysis that was the strong suit of the late scholastics.
2.1 Legal theory
The law of evidence is only one example of the deep infl uence of late scho-
lasticism on later legal theory. Modern law — especially Anglo-American law, 
which does not depend directly on the Roman texts — shows many evidences of 
its centuries of development under the scholastic intellectual oikumene. In intel-
lectual style, the law is still very close to the scholastic method, with its respect 
for old authorities and its endlessly elaborating commentary and formal dispute 
on conceptual points and fi ne distinctions, comparison of texts, and logical ar-
gument for and against propositions25 (and in many countries still, in its style 
of dress). Western law has also inherited  om the scholastics and canon lawyers 
22 D. Soto, De iustitia et iure, lb. 6, q. 7 (Lyons, 1569), quoted in Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, 286.
23 A. Escobar y Mendoza, Liber theologiae moralis (Lyons, 1644), 400–401; Franklin, Science of 
Coǌ ecture, 301.
24 Observed by E. Coumet, “Le problème des partis avant Pascal”, Archives internationales d’histoire 
des sciences 17 (1965): 244–272.
25 Some discussion in S. A. Siegel, “The Aristotelian basis of English law 1450–1800”, New York 
University Law Review 56 (1981): 18–59.
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a special concern for the relation between ethical principles and the law as it 
stands, with principles of justice, fairness and equity being regarded as essential 
values that positive law cannot transgress.26
The process by which this came about has been closely studied for the law 
of contract, in Gordley’s Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine. The 
largely unexplained rules of ancient Roman law were given explanations in terms 
of Aristotelian concepts of the nature of contract, and the Spanish scholastics of 
the sixteenth century were responsible for a synthesis, Aristotelian in concep-
tion and Roman in detail, involving a casuistry of will, consent,  aud, mistake, 
duress and so on. Later legal theorists up to the present retained the scholastic 
language and distinctions, though ignoring as far as possible the underlying 
Aristotelian philosophy.27
A similar story is told in Brian Tierney’s work on the origin of natural rights 
theories, the conception of pre-legal human rights that has had such success 
since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Scholastic debate on 
the confl icting jurisdictions of the middle ages, church and civil, led William of 
Ockham and later scholastic writers to a theory of individual rights existing prior 
to any human laws, and constituting a moral foundation that human laws were 
bound (morally) not to transgress. It was transmitted to later centuries by sev-
enteenth-century writers such as Grotius.28 Related conceptions dealing with the 
ethical protection of individuals became even more deeply embedded in Western 
law, notably the principle of equality before the law29 and the presumption of 
innocence for the defendant in criminal cases. The formulation “everyone is 
presumed innocent, unless proved guilty” is found in the canon lawyer Johannes 
Monachus about 1300.30 For both of these principles there are brief Roman law 
origins, but the development of them as moral concepts fundamental to the law 
is a scholastic achievement.
26 Background for English law in D. R. Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early 
Modern England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).
27 J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); 
P. Grossi (ed), La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno (Milan: Giuﬀ rè, 1973).
28 B. Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on natural rights, natural law and church law, 
1150–1625 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); K. Pennington, “Review essay: the history of rights in Western 
thought”, Emory Law Journal 47 (1998): 237–252; C. J. Reid, “Canonistic contribution to the Western 
rights tradition: an historical inquiry”, Boston College Law Review 33, 2 (1991): 37–92.
29 J. M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 29–30, 146–148, 
191–193.
30 F. Quintard-Morénas, “The presumption of innocence in the French and Anglo-American legal 
traditions”, American Journal of Comparative Law 58 (2010): 107–149; K. Pennington, “Innocent until 
proven guilty: the origins of a legal maxim”, The Jurist, 63 (2003): 106–124.
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The Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth century were the most infl uential 
thinkers on law, ethics and the intersection of the two. Especially prominent 
were their contributions to international law, which, not being under the con-
trol of any king, legislature or court, has a character more suited to the abstract 
discussion of the scholastics than the law of individual states. It was studied 
in the fourteenth century when it was recognised that Italian city states were 
de facto independent, whatever the pretensions of the Empire. The history of 
international law has had many decades to absorb the inclusion of the works of 
Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), in English, 
in Scott’s Classics of International Law, but credit for those scholastics’ ideas is 
still o en given to later thinkers like Grotius and Pufendorf.31 A characteristic 
problem in the area, considered by Suarez and others, is the right and duty of 
humanitarian intervention on behalf of peoples oppressed by a tyrant; the issue 
remains as relevant as ever.32
Law is particularly important for the early modern development of ideas 
because of the large place it held in public life and intellectual training. Of the 
founders of modern thought, Copernicus, Bacon, Fermat, Huygens and Leibniz 
were professional lawyers, Montaigne a judge, Machiavelli, Pascal and Arnauld 
the sons of lawyers, and Petrarch, Rabelais, Luther, Calvin, Donne and Descartes 
former law students.33
2.2 Political theory
Political theory was conceived in legal and moral terms and the concepts 
of those disciplines formed the language in which political debates took place. 
Notions of constitutional government, the restraints of custom and tradition, 
31 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 2nd ed. (New York, 1954), ch. 2; “Bartolo 
on the confl ict of laws”, trans. J. A. C. Smith, American Journal of Legal History 14 (1970): 157–183, 
247–275; J. Muldoon, Canon Law, the Expansion of Europe, and World Order (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1998); F. de Vitoria, De Indis et De Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. E. Nys (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 
1917); F. Suarez, Selections from Three Works (Oxford: Clarendon, 1944); see J. B. Scott, The Spanish 
Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1934 (and 
to the contrary, Nussbaum, A Conise History of the Law of Nations, appendix II); D. Kennedy, “Primitive 
legal scholarship”, Harvard International Law Journal 27 (1986): 1–98; P. Stein, Roman Law in European 
History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94–97; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 1.
32 T. Meron, “Common rights of mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suárez”, American Journal of 
International Law 1991; on a related topic, G. Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International 
Hospitality, the Global Community, and Political Justice since Vitoria (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
33 Franklin, Science of Coǌ ecture, 348–352; W. Bouwsma, “Lawyers and early modern culture”, 
American Historical Review 78 (1973): 303–327.
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and the subtle relations between legitimacy of government and popular consent, 
are medieval achievements in both theory and practice.34 The reasonableness of 
scholastic discussions of those matters is in some ways only now being attained 
again, a er many unhappy detours through extremist theories of absolute mon-
archy, the divine right of kings, utopianism, theocracy, revolution and class war. 
The one-sidedness of such theories accounts for their memorability, and hence 
the corresponding diﬃ  culty of remembering more nuanced theories. It accounts 
also for their disastrous consequences in practice.
Simplifi ed counterfactual situations are a staple of scholastic analysis in all 
fi elds. In political theory, they include the long-running scenario of a “state of 
nature” in which all are “born  ee and equal”, which was considered by Suarez 
in his considerations on the native Americans.35
2.3 Economics
In economic history, the idea that the serious development of theory began 
with the seventeenth-century Mercantilists (perhaps with Aristotle deserving 
some passing mention) was exploded by Schumpeter and others, with their 
examination of the scholastics of, especially, the sixteenth century,36 but it can 
34 A. Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250–1450 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
J. M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992); Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), vol. II, ch. 5; B. Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain: 
A study of the political ideals of Vitoria, de Soto, Suárez and Molina (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963); D. E. 
Luscombe, ch. 40 of Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny & 
J. Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); J. H. Burns, “The scholastics”, ch. 5, and 
H. A. Lloyd, “Constitutionalism”, ch. 9 of Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, ed. J. H. 
Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); F. de Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. A. Pagden, 
trans. J. Lawrance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); K. Pennington, The Prince and the 
Law, 1200–1600: Sovereignty and rights in the Western legal tradition (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993).
35 J. P. Doyle, “Francisco Suárez on preaching the Gospel to people like the American Indians”, 
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Scholasticism in Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); B. J. Gordon, Economic 
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Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957); M. Grice-Hutchinson, 
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hardly be said to be common property even now. Concepts like demand, capital, 
labour, utility, scarcity and the cost of lost opportunity were developed at length 
by the scholastics, based on Aristotle’s brief remarks. It is diﬃ  cult to evaluate 
the contribution of the business community itself to these notions, for lack of 
evidence, but at present it seems that the explicit names and distinctions were 
due more to the scholastics’ need for precision in ethical and legal discussions 
than to any strictly business requirements. In any case, the distinction between 
ethics and business was once not so rigidly drawn. Oresme’s monetary theory 
is only one of the connections between the scholastics and more applied and 
mathematical investigations into business.37
2.4 Psychology
Psychology, especially of the introspective kind, was also well-adapted to the 
scholastic method, although in this case the main developments came earlier. 
The general medieval concentration on the inner life encouraged by Augustine, 
the self-examination of enforced confession and Aristotle’s De anima is refl ected 
in the extensive attention given to the mind and soul in scholastic works  om 
the time of Albert the Great and Aquinas, and the large number of texts on 
psychological subjects in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.38
 One of the longest-running themes in the history of psychology is “faculty 
psychology”, as advanced by Avicenna and his Western scholastic followers  om 
Aquinas on. Faculty psychology holds that human cognition is decomposable 
into largely distinct tasks like sensation, comparison of diﬀ erent sensory modali-
ties, memory and so on, which are undertaken by diﬀ erent “faculties” located in 
diﬀ erent regions of the brain. It was the natural way of organising psychological 
data for many centuries,39 and its (Latin) language is the way we still express our 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986); overview in M. Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual 
Tradition, 400–1400 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), ch. 25; W. Decock, “Lessius and the 
breakdown of the scholastic paradigm”, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 31 (2009): 57–78; 
later connections in R. E. Prasch, “The origins of the a priori method in classical political economy”, 
Journal of Economic Issues 30 (1996): 1105–1125. 
37 J. Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange and the Emergence 
of Scientifi c Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); R. W. Hadden, On the Shoulders 
of Merchants: Exchange and the Mathematical Conception of Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), ch. 4. 
38 H. Schüling, Bibliographie der psychologischen Literatur des 16. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim: Olms, 
1967); S. Kemp, Medieval Psychology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); J. Zupko, “What is the science 
of the soul?”, Synthese 110 (1997): 297–334; S. K. Knebel, “Scotists vs. Thomists: what seventeenth-century 
scholastic psychology was about”, Modern Schoolman 74 (1997): 219–26.
39 A. Kenny, Aquinas (New York: Hill & Wang, 1980), ch 3; E. Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological 
Theory in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (London: Warburg Institute, 1975); E. P. Mahoney, “Sense, 
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“folk” psychological explanations of behaviour in terms of aspirations, sensations, 
imagination, actions, motives, emotions and so on.40 As with the language of 
science, it is no accident that these words are Latin and the senses in which we 
use them are medieval more than classical. As a typical example, the OED traces 
the etymology of “imagination” thus: in classical Latin, it means the action of 
forming mental images, but in medieval Latin and European vernaculars, it is in 
the fi rst instance the faculty in which mental images are formed: in Old French 
c. 1174, Catalan and Italian late 13th century, Spanish and Portuguese 14th century, 
English c. 1340.41
While the approach was disparaged in the 1950s heyday of behaviourism, the 
revival of faculty psychology under various names has been one vigorous strand 
in more recent cognitive psychology.42
2.5 Linguistics
Grammar was a foundation stone of medieval education, and the inherited 
texts were  om the 12th century subjected to the same process as legal texts, of 
glossing and commentary in search of the philosophical principles underlying 
them. Many of the concerns of modern semiotics on the diﬀ erent ways in which 
words can have meaning are visible in medieval debates about signs. For example, 
Augustine’s conception of a sign as something that is perceived and suggests 
something else to some mind raises questions about signs of the non-existent, 
signs not interpreted by any mind, and about the sameness of the “mental words” 
in the minds of speakers of diﬀ erent languages.43
intellect and imagination in Albert, Thomas and Siger”, ch. 30 of The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy; N. H. Steneck, “Albert on the psychology of sense perception”, in Albertus Magnus 
and the Sciences, ed. J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), 263–290; 
refs to Avicenna’s originals in D. L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic 
Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 202, n. 66; also Avicenna’s Psychology, trans. F. Rahman (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952).
40 S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1983); 
T. P. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
41 “Imagination”, Oxford English Dictionary.
42 J. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay in Faculty Psychology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Pres, 
1983); M. Minsky, Society of Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
43 S. Meier-Oeser, “Medieval Semiotics”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, url = 〈http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/semiotics-
medieval/〉; E. Vineis and A. Maierù, “Medieval linguistics”, in History of Linguistics, ed. G. Lepschy, 
vol. II (London: Longman, 1994), ch. 2; G. L. Bursill-Hall, Speculative Grammars of the Middle Ages 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1971); U. Eco and C. Marmo (eds.), On the Medieval Theory of Signs (Amsterdam: 
J. Beǌ amins, 1989); L. Kaczmarek, “The age of the sign: new light on the role of the fourteenth century 
in the history of semiotics”, Dialogue (Canada) 31 (1992): 509–515; C. Panaccio, “Ockham and Locke on 
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Vocabulary is one of great hidden successes of scholasticism. The present-day 
international language, in which this article is written, is a blend of Old English, 
Norman French and scholastic Latin; and it is the vast inheritance of scholastic 
vocabulary, mostly still carrying its medieval meaning, that bears the weight of 
academic discussion on all subjects.44 Consider the current section in general, 
or the present sentence in particular, or examine adjacent portions of the text, 
for a variety of natural and artifi cial examples of scholastic abstract vocabulary.
2.6 Philosophy
While this article is focussed on the scholastics’ contribution in areas other 
than their philosophical doctrines, the story would be incomplete without men-
tioning that they had a largely hidden infl uence on the conceptual apparatus of 
modern philosophy, just as they had in mathematics, law and the social sciences.
Since Gilson’s studies a hundred years ago of Descartes’ scholastic vocabulary, 
there has been much work on the dependence of the founders of modern philoso-
phy on the conceptual apparatus of scholasticism.45 The scholastics controlled 
the well-funded university posts, the academic presses and the curricula; their 
logic and philosophy were a central part of what every educated person had to 
learn.46 The rationalists and empiricists who attacked the scholastics so force-
fully provide perfect examples of the old topos of students and their teachers 
disagreeing heatedly on answers, but exhibiting a unity of questions, unspoken 
assumptions and concepts. The fi ercest opponents at, so to speak, the species 
mental language”, in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700, 
ed. R. L. Friedman and L. O. Nielsen (Kluwer: Dordrecht, 2003), 37–51.
44 J. Franklin, “Mental furniture  om the philosophers”, Et Cetera 40 (1983): 177–191.
45 E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cartésien (Paris: Alcan, 1913); É. Gilson, Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée 
médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: Vrin, 1951); F. P. van der Pitte, “Some of Descartes’ 
debts to Eustachius a Sancto Paulo”, Monist 71 (1988): 487–497; R. Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); J. Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Scholastic Origins of Modern 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); A. Tellkamp, Das Verhältnis John Lockes 
zur Scholastik (Münster: Aschendorﬀ , 1927); W. H. Kenney, “John Locke and the Oxford Training 
in Logic and Metaphysics” (Dissertation, St Louis University, 1959); E. J. Ashworth, “‘Do words 
signi  ideas or things?’ The scholastic sources of Locke’s theory of language”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 19 (1981): 299–326; D. Connell, The Vision in God: Malebranche’s Scholastic Sources (Louvain: 
Nauwelaerts, 1967); P. Reif, “The textbook tradition in natural philosophy, 1600–1650”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 30 (1969): 17–32.
46 R. Ariew and A. Gabbey, ch. 15 of Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, ed. 
D. Garber and M. Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); M. H. Curtis, Oxford and 
Cambridge in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), 111; W. T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at 
Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958), 49–50; H. F. 
Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John Milton, vol II (Urbana, Ill: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1961), ch 7.
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level are found to be united at the genus level. Descartes and Locke underwent 
particularly heavy exposure to scholasticism in their formative years, and the 
questions they ask, and the vocabulary of their answers, stray remarkably little 
 om their teachers’ practice. Gassendi very pointedly asks why the Cartesian 
ego, having doubted everything and put aside all prejudice and tradition, is still 
spouting scholastic terminology.47
Conclusion
There is less than meets the eye to the explosion of knowledge of which 
contemporary intellectual life boasts. Vast quantities of new empirical facts have 
indeed been observed and theories verifi ed, but the conceptual superstructure 
into which they have been integrated is an old one. It is the one bequeathed to 
modern times by the later scholastics.
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Science by Conceptual Analysis: The Genius of the Late Scholastics
SUMMARIUM
Scientia per resolutionem conceptuum
sive de scholasticorum seriorum ingenio
Scholastici qui saec. 14.–17. fl orebant praeter philosophiam multas partes scientiae excolu-
erunt. Methodus, qua usi sunt, “analysis conceptualis” seu ars resolvendi conceptus dici potest. 
Methodus ista maxime in scientiis speculatione potius quam experientia innitentibus fecunda 
est. Inter quos notanda est mathematica, in qua scholastici analysin motus continui (cuius 
elaboratione calculus subsequenter confectus est) et doctrinam de mensura risici seu periculi ac 
probabilitate excogitaverunt. Analytica tamen methodus praecipue in scientiis socialibus appli-
cationem meruit. In iurisprudentia scholastici e. g. analysin moralem validitatis contractorum 
et de iure naturali doctrinam perfecerunt. In doctrina politica scholastici constitutionalismum 
et experimentum conceptuale “status naturalis” introduxerunt. Doctrinam oeconomicam 
scholastici notionibus augebant, quae usque ad hoc tempus fundamentales reputantur – ut 
notiones necessitatis (seu quaesitionis), capitalis, laboris, inopiae. Ultra hoc adde psychologiam 
potentiarum animae et semioticen. Posterior omnium huiusmodi doctrinarum evolutio et 
vocabulario, et conceptibus scholasticis magna ex parte semper innitebatur.
ABSTRACT
Science by Conceptual Analysis: The Genius of the Late Scholastics
The late scholastics, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, contributed to many fi elds 
of knowledge other than philosophy. They developed a method of conceptual analysis that was 
very productive in those disciplines in which theory is relatively more important than empirical 
results. That includes mathematics, where the scholastics developed the analysis of continuous 
motion, which fed into the calculus, and the theory of risk and probability. The method came 
to the fore especially in the social sciences. In legal theory they developed, for example, the ethical 
analyses of the conditions of validity of contracts, and natural rights theory. In political theory, 
they introduced constitutionalism and the thought experiment of a “state of nature”. Their 
contributions to economics included concepts still regarded as basic, such as demand, capital, 
labour, and scarcity. Faculty psychology and semiotics are other areas of signifi cance. In such 
disciplines, later developments rely crucially on scholastic concepts and vocabulary.
